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The burden of the welfare state may be analysed from an economic as well as a 
more normative perspective. This paper attempts to do both things. By the use of the 
case of Sweden the expansion and the costs of the welfare state is described,  partly 
in international comparison, and explained, largely in terms of unintended 
consequences. Special attention is given to the effects of taxes. Next, the concept of 
dignity is explicated and used to evaluate the Swedish welfare state. The overall 
conclusion is that the burden of the welfare state is high indeed, both in economic 
terms and from the perspective of human dignity. Consequently, if we want to 






The burden of the welfare state and the high tax levels necessarily associated with it 
may be expressed in economic terms such as low growth rates, economic 
inefficiencies and high unemployment levels. This is an important venture and I shall 
devote a considerable part of this paper to such issues, with a special focus on  
taxes. However, the burden of the welfare state may also, and perhaps more 
appropriately, be described in terms of its consequences on human dignity.  
 
The case to be analysed below is Sweden. It may be the most extreme example but 
there are definitely great similarities with other welfare states such as Germany and 
many other West-European countries. 
 
  1The purpose of this paper then is to describe and explain the development of the 
Swedish welfare state, and also to evaluate it from the perspective of economic 
efficiency and human dignity.  
 
In the first section the general characteristics of the Swedish case are presented, 
partly in international comparison. The following section provides an explanation of 
the development of the welfare state, largely in terms of unintended consequences. 
Thereafter special attention is given to the effects of taxes. Next, the concept of 
dignity is explicated and used to evaluate the Swedish welfare state. The paper ends 
with a section about possible lessons for other countries. 
 
 
The Swedish Case 
 
For many years the Swedish welfare state portrayed itself as a model to the world.
 1 
To many this was also how it was perceived. For example already in 1936 Marquis 
William Childs published the book Sweden: The Middle Way (Childs 1936) which 
described the Swedish model as the middle of the road between capitalism and 
socialism. Sweden was thought to have found a way to combine economic 
development and growth with generous, publicly provided welfare programmes “from 
the cradle to the grave”. For these reasons even a well-established economist like 
Assar Lindbeck regarded the Swedish welfare state a triumph of modern civilization 
(Lindbeck 1993, p. 98). 
 
However, the reality of the Swedish model has become quite different to what was 
intended and to what many people still believe to be the case. Five stylised facts may 
illustrate the present situation:
                                                 
1 See e.g. Korpi (1991) and  Meidner (1994). 
  2 
I.  No job on net have been produced in the private sector since 1950.
2 
II.  None of the top 50 companies on the Stockholm stock exchange has been 
started since 1970.
3 
III.  Sweden has dropped from fourth  to 14
th place in 2002 among the OECD 
countries in terms of GDP per capita since 1970.
4 
IV.  Well over one million people out of a work force of around five millions do not 
work in 2003 but live on various kinds of public welfare programmes such a pre-
pension schemes, unemployment benefits, sick-leave programmes etc.
5 
V.  A majority of the adult population are either employed by the state or clients of 




However, the characteristics of the current situation are of course the result of a long 
process. A few aspects of it should emphasized. 
 
In the mid-19
th century Sweden, like many other European countries, went through a 
period of rapid institutional change. Within a few decades the economy was 
deregulated, taxes were lowered and tariffs were abolished. Moreover, modern 
institutions such as limited liability corporations and patent laws were introduced. In 
addition, the political system was changed into a two chamber parliamentary system 
with successively increased suffrage.  
 
As a consequence a period of high growth and social change occurred. From 1890 to 
1950 Sweden was the fastest growing country in the world (Krantz 2004). Several 
major industries, e.g. in mining, forestry, paper, high-current electric equipment, 
telecommunications, chemicals, car manufacturing etc., were founded around the 
turn of the century. Over the coming decades many of the leading companies in 
these industries developed into large international corporations. Parallel to this 
economic development a dynamic civil society evolved with numerous voluntary 
                                                 
2 Davidsson and Henrekson (2002) 
3 Henrekson  (2002) 
4 OECD (2004) 
5 Actually it was  1 035 958 full-time equivalents, which in practice is many more individual. See SCB 
(2003) and Dagens Nyheter  (2003). 
6 Zetterberg (1995), p. 54-57 
  3organizations and clubs. Sweden was transformed from a poor rural country into one 
of the wealthy modern society. 
 
During this period Sweden was in fact a low-tax country, a fact that is not even well 
known in Sweden. In Figure 1 below the development of the Swedish tax level is 
presented: 
 
























































Indirect taxes Social security contributions
Comment: By direct taxes is meant taxes paid by individuals, e.g. the income tax. By indirect taxes is 
meant taxes paid by corporations, e.g. value-added taxes. Social security contributions consists of 
taxes paid by employers as well as individuals to mandatory social security systems. 
Source: Johansson (2004) and Riksskatteverket (2002) 
 
As shown, around 1900 the taxes amounted to around 8 percent of GDP and it was 
not until 1950 that the taxes rose to around 20 percent. By the mid-1970’s it had 
reached the current level between 50 and 60 percent of GDP (2002: 52 percent), the 
highest in the world, at least among democratic countries. Note also the increasing 
share of indirect taxes and payments to social insurances. In Table 1 the 
development of the tax rates for all the OECD-countries and some other countries for 
which data is available are presented: 
 
  4Table 1: Total taxes as percentage of GDP in different countries 
  
  1925 1933 1950 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999
Australia       22,3 22,9 26,6 27,4 29,1 29,3 29,4 29,9 30,6
Austria       33,9 34,9 37,7 39,5 41,6 40,2 41,6 44,4 43,9
Belgium       31,1 35,7 41,6 43,1 46,3 43,1  44,8  45,9 45,7
Chec  Rep.            40,1  38,3 40,4
Denmark  19,6 20,1 19,8 25,3 29,9 40,4 41,4 43,9 47,4 47,1 49,4 49,8 50,4
Finland  21,6 20,1 27,8 27,5 30,3 32,5 37,7 36,2 40,0 44,7 44,9 46,2 46,2
France  21,1 26,3 30,2 33,4 34,5 35,1 36,9 40,6 43,8 43,0 44,0 45,2 45,8
Germany  17,8 23,0 30,1 33,9 31,6 32,9 36,0 33,1 32,9 32,6 38,2 37,0 37,7
Great  Britain  22,6 25,2 33,1 27,3 30,4 37 35,4 35,3 37,7 36,0 35,2 37,2 36,3
Greece       18,2 20,9 21 24 28,6 29,4  31,7    37,1
Hungary             42,4  38,7 39,2
Irland       24,9 29,9 30,2 31,5 35,1 33,6 33,1 32,2 32,3
Island       26,2 27,0 29,6 29,2 28,4 31,4 32,1 33,6 36,3
Italy 17,5  30,6    27,0 25,5 26,1 26,2 30,3 34,4 38,9 41,2 42,7 43,3
Japan       18,3 19,7 20,9 25,4 27,6 30,9 28,4 28,4 26,2
Kanada       25,9 31,2 33,1 32 33,1 36,1 35,7 37,4 38,2
South  Korea         15,2 17,7 16,9 19,1 20,5 21,1 23,6
Luxembourg       27,7 28,9 39,7 40,8 45,3 40,7 41,9 41,5 41,8
Mexico          16,2 17 17,3  16,6  16,0 16,o
Netherlands  14,9 18,6 30,3 30,4 32,8 37,1 43,0 43,4 42,4 43,1 41,9 41.0 42,1
New Zeeland         24,7 27,4 31,1 33,0 33,6 38,1 37,6 35,2 35,6
Norway 20,9  25,1    32,0 29,6 34,9 39,9 42,7 43,3 41,8 41,5 43,6 41,6
Poland             39,8  37,9 35,2
Portugal       15,8 19,8 21,2 24,6 27,1 29,6 32,7 34,2 34,3
Slovakia              37,1 35,1
Spain       14,7 16,9 19,5 22,9 27,6 33,0 32,8 34,2 35,1
Sweden  16,0 18,9 21,0 28,7 35 39,8 43,4 47,1 48,3 53,7 47,6 52,0 52,2
Switzerland       19,6 22,5 27,9 28,9 30,6 30,6 33,5 35,1 34,4
Turkey       10,6 12,5 16,0 17,9 15,4 20 22,6 28,7 31,3
USA  11,0 23,4 23,9 27,5 25 27,7 26,9 27 26,1 26,7 27,6 28,9 28,9
Average  18,3  23,1  27,0  29,3         
EU  15       25,8 28,9 31,1 35,8 38,6 39,2  40,1  41,3 41,6
OECD       27,8 31,2 34,1 32,1 33,8 35,0 36,1 37,0 37,3
Comment: Year 1925 and 1933 as percentage of GDI. 
Source: Johansson (2004), Rodriguez (1981, Table 2.1) and Riksskatteverket (2002, Table 14.3).  
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Again, in 1950 the Swedish taxes were lower than in most other European countries 
as well as the USA. Also in 1960 the Swedish tax level was below the average, but 
by 1965 Sweden had the highest taxes of the listed countries.
7 One should also note 
that there is an upward trend for tax rates in all countries all through the 20
th century, 
except perhaps for the last few years for a few countries. 
 
The reason for this development was of course the rise of the Swedish welfare state 
and the consequent expansion of public expenditures. In figure 2 the development of 
public expenditures in Sweden as a percentage of GDP is presented: 































Source: Moberg (2004) 
 
Up until around 1960 the public expenditures of Sweden did not differ much from 
other comparable countries. But thereafter Sweden definitely took the lead, as shown 
in table 2 below: 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that Figure 1 and Table 1 are based on different statistical series which explains 
the slight differences between them. 
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Table 2: Government expenditure in a number of countries expressed as percentage 
of GDP 1960-1995 
  1960 1980 1990 1995 
Australia  21 32 35 37 
Austria    36 48 49 53 
Belgium  30 59 55 55 
Canada  29 39 46 46 
France  35 46 50 54 
Germany  32 49 45 50 
Ireland  28 49 41 42 
Italy  30 42 53 52 
Japan  18 32 32 36 
Netherlands  34 55 54 51 
New  Zealand  27 38 41 35 
Norway  30 38 54 49 
Spain  19 32 42 44 
Sweden  31 60 59 66 
Switzerland  17 33 34 39 
UK  32 43 40 43 
USA  27 32 33 33 
Arithmetic  average  28 43 45 46 
      
Source: Krantz (2004) and Tanzi/Schuknecht (1997), p. 397. 
 
After 1995 the public expenditure have declined somewhat in Sweden as well as in 
some other countries. 
 
 
  7A Largely Unintended Development 
 
There are many reasons behind this development. Obviously ideology is important. 
From 1932 up until today the social democrats have been in power except for two 
short periods, 1976-1982 and 1991-1994. But also during those nine years with non-
socialist government, taxes and public expenditures continued to expand. In fact, the 
two peaks on the on the curve showing the growth of the Swedish public 
expenditures in Figure 2 occurred during those periods. 
 
This welfare state ideology favoured substantial interventions in markets as well as in 
the civil society. For example labour markets became heavily regulated in order to 
promote job security. Also substantial legislation favoured collective wage bargaining 
and democratic corporativist arrangements. Moreover, the traditional roles of families 
were largely taken over by the state in the form of child care, the care of the sick and 
elderly etc. 
 
In this sense the development of the welfare state and the high tax levels necessarily 
associated with it was clearly something deliberate and wanted. However, if we want 
to understand how and why the welfare state has evolved it is quite clear that such 
explanations are insufficient, in particular since the expansion of the welfare state is 
an international phenomenon.  
 
In previous work (Karlson 1993 and 2002) I have developed two general explanatory 
models or mechanisms, the logic of conceit and the logic of opportunism, which may 
explain the emergence of the welfare state as a largely unintended consequence of 
human action, within the tradition of spontaneous orders (or disorders) by F. A. 
Hayek (1973) and Adam Smith’s (1981/19776) analysis of the invisible hand. What 
follows in this section draws heavily on that work.  
 
The starting point for both models is a society with a small democratic state and 
where markets and communities are important, much like the Sweden around 1900 
as mentioned above 
 
  8In the first explanation it is assumed that voters and politicians are all benevolent and 
involved in a project to make society better. The “good life” is to be attained through 
the means of politics. 
 
The members and voluntary organizations and clubs which were created for mutual 
support, aid and enlightenment of members, and sometimes even non-members, in 
areas like basic or adult education, charity, industrial and labour relations, consumer 
issues, the production of local public goods, culture, care of the elderly and so on, no 
doubt felt that their means and resources were entirely insufficient to handle all the 
urgent problems. They therefore turned their eyes to the state and asked for various 
types of interventions by the state. 
 
Knowledge, information and expertise, it was argued, could be centralized in the 
state, which through deliberate interventions should improve conditions in markets 
and civil society. Most importantly, markets should not be eliminated but 
circumvented and improved. Such interventions, as von Mises argued as early as 
1927, are isolated acts, not socialist attempts to completely abolish private property 
and plan the whole economy. Rather, they are supposed to constitute a “third way” 
(Mises 1985/1927, p. 76) between socialism and capitalism.  
 
Such views gained wide support in politics as well as in academia. For example Karl 
Popper (1966a/1945, pp. 158-159) argued that the state should engage in piecemeal 
social engineering and fight against the most urgent evils of society. In the economic 
sphere Popper argues that “the principle of non-intervention, of an unconstrained 
economic system, has to be given up … we must demand that the policy of –
unlimited economic freedom be replaced by the planned economic intervention by 
the state.” (Popper 1966b/1945, p. 125) Similar ideas of course lie behind 
Keynesianism, that the economy should be fine-tuned through deliberate 
interventions by the state.  
 
These ideas tended to focus on the immediate solutions to the asserted problems – 
the long-run consequences were ignored or openly disregarded. In particular, it was 
believed that large-scale negative consequences of such policies could be avoided. 
However, many of these benevolent interventions give rise to a number of 
  9unintended consequences which not only often tend to pervert the original ends and 
values but also legitimise further interventions, leading to additional unintended 
consequences, which in turn necessitate further interventions, and so on. The 
primary reason being that the individual actors in markets and civil society rationally 
adapt to the signals and incentives given by the interventions themselves. This is 
what the logic of conceit is all about – how an exaggerated belief in politics as a 
means to promote ends which may even be politically unattainable has caused an 
unintended growth of the state. 
 
There are numerous policy-caused social problems of this type (Karlson 2002, p. 
143-150). Rent control causes house shortages, black markets, rationing, less 
construction, new interventions, subsidies, regulations and in the end higher cost of 
living for most people. Job-security legislation causes reluctance to hire people, less 
innovation, fewer new firms, less employment, less flexibility on labour markets, 
health problems among employees, new interventions, and in the end increased 
insecurity to many people. Labour market policies and job-creating measures exert a 
upward pressure on real wages, crowding out of regular employment, new 
interventions, and in the end increased open unemployment. The public provision of 
goods and services causes lack of competition, less innovation, higher costs, new 
interventions, and in the end less availability of those goods and services. And so on. 
 
Conceited politicians and voters may thus as an unintended consequence have 
promoted the growth of the state and higher taxes into something quite similar to the 
modern welfare state. Every step in itself may have been deliberate and intentional, 
but the end result, with a weakened role for communities and the civil society as well 
as undermined and less dynamic markets, is surely something that was unforeseen 
and probably also unwanted. 
 
In the second model or mechanism, the logic of opportunism, it is no longer naively 
assumed that the political actors are value rational, benevolent and directed towards 
the establishment of the good society. Neither does it implicitly treat politics as a 
unitary actor, but regards it as a struggle or competition between different actors with 
conflicting interests. The basis for this logic is thus the assumption that politicians, 
voters, bureaucrats and other actors on the political scene – such as interest groups, 
  10labour unions and firms – primarily have their own self-interest as the ultimate motive 
for their actions. 
 
With such a perspective, largely studied within public choice theory, it is evident that 
the political process is far from optimal and that there exist a number of systematic 
political failures. Two aspects should be briefly highlighted: the dominance of special-
interest groups and myopic decisions. 
 
There are many reason why narrow special interests are likely to have their way in 
the political process. One major cause is that different groups in society vary in their 
ability to articulate and aggregate their interests (Olson 1965). The demands on the 
state will be asymmetrical – there is a tendency for groups which represent really 
wide and common interests to remain unorganised, while more concentrated and 
strong interests, which are shared by a smaller number of actors, are more easy to 
articulate. The prevalent absence of strong interest groups furthering the interest of 
consumers, bank savers and tax payers serves to illustrate the first part of the 
argument, while the latter is exemplified by the overwhelming existence of special-
interest groups in support of subsidies to farmers, labour market regulations and 
restrictions on imports from the developing countries etc. 
 
Moreover, these concentrated and privileged groups are also likely to meet weak 
resistance from the voter majority to the policies they propose. The cost of these 
concentrated measures are often possible to diffuse over large groups of citizens. 
This implies that each individual voter only will experience  a slight increase in his 
costs and thus not find it in his or her self-interest to oppose it. The political parties 
and politicians therefore are also likely devote a disproportionate amount of attention 
to policies of this kinds. 
 
The economic consequences of this asymmetry have been discussed at length by 
Mancur Olson (1982) and others. The general conclusion is that growth rates will 
decline and the size of the state will grow. 
 
The second general tendency of the democratic political process is the 
encouragement of short-sighted or myopic decisions. Partly, we have already 
  11touched upon this question above: narrow special interests are often precisely 
expressed in the forms of demands for legislation which is in the specific group’s 
short-term interest while being counter to the long-term good of society at large.  
 
For example, when tenants of rental apartments cry our for rent control, they 
disregard the interest of people who currently do not have a lease and future 
generations of potential tenants who become shut out from the rental market 
because of declining construction rates of new apartments and the low mobility 
between different-sized flat and different types of accommodation, such as private 
houses and condos. The same argument also applies to legislation which ensures 
that people can keep their jobs, stipulate minimum wages, give protective measures 
or subsidies to ailing industries, pay-as-you-go pension schemes, and so on – these 
all accord to this type of short-run benefits to specific groups. 
 
The overall, basically unintended, consequence of these tendencies is that the 
political decisions will often focus on direct, expansionary and consumption-oriented 
measures, instead of more indirect, instrumental and investment-oriented 
alternatives. Over time the state will grow and the taxes get higher, resulting into 
something quite similar to the modern welfare state. And again, markets and the 
communities in civil society will be undermined. 
 
Both the logic of conceit and the logic of opportunism may thus explain the 
emergence of the welfare state. In practice a synthesis is likely. Something of a 
historical irony may be involved in such as development. Well-meaning politicians 
who solely intended to promote a good society may in the end come to favour and 
patronize various more selfish special interests. It should also be noted that this 
process is largely self-enforcing. The bigger the state becomes and the more politics 
comes to dominate society, the greater the reasons for different actors and interests 
to try to use the state for their own narrow and myopic special interests. The larger 
and more complex the role of the state, the harder and more costly it also becomes 
for the voters to inform themselves about the totality of the political decisions, the 
programs of political parties and the activities of the politicians and bureaucrats. 
These will therefore gain an increasing independence from the actual wishes of the 
voters. 
  12 
Figure 3 below illustrates the development from a society with a small state, dynamic 
markets and a lively civil society around the year 1900 to the present situation where 
the markets and civil society really have been crowded out and are appendages to 
the state. The size of the circles are intended to indicate the size of the three sectors 
respectively. This applies to Sweden as well as to many other welfare states. 
 
Figure 3: State, markets and civil society 
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What Taxes Do 
 
Presently the Swedish tax share is 52 percent and the public expenditures amount to 
57 percent of GDP. Most of the taxes are levied on labour, almost two-thirds. As a 
consequence an average Swedish worker pays 60 percent of his income in taxes, if 
direct and indirect taxes as well as social security contributions are summed up. In a 
similar manner holders of shares of companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
pay around 60 percent in taxes if company taxes, property taxes, taxes on dividends 
and so on are summed up. Successful entrepreneurs sometimes pay even more. 
This largely explains the five stylized facts reported above. 
 
With taxes at those levels it is not surprising that the burden of the welfare state is 
high. In economic terms this often expressed as the excess burden of taxes. If we 
limit ourselves to taxes on labour the excess burden consists primarily of a lower 
  13level of participation in the labour market. Moreover the citizens will work less 
efficiently and with the wrong things. In particular, the taxes drive in a wedge between 
buyers and sellers on the labour market which hampers the division of labour and 
specialisation in the economy, with lower productivity and lower long-term growth as 
an unavoidable consequence. Also a black economy will arise in many sectors of the 
economy. 
 
This tax wedge may be measured in a number ways. It is e.g. common to express it 
in terms of the total marginal effect of the taxes. In table 3 below, however, it is 
presented in terms of how much an individual has to earn in order to pay someone 
1000 SEK, or some other currency, for a certain service job: 
 
Tabel 3: Income requirement for the purchase of services in different countries 2001 
 
   Marginal    Net  Marginal   
 Net  Tax,  Market  Income  Tax,    Income 
  Income     Soc. Sec.  Price  Requirement Soc. Sec.  Requirement
 to  Benefits,    to  Benefits   
 Seller  Indirect  tax   Buyer     
Belgium  1 000  2 703  3 703  3 703  6 010  9 713 
Denmark  1 000  1 477  2 477  2 477  4 162  6 639 
Germany  1 000  2 241  3 241  3 241  3 396  6 637 
Sweden  1 000  1 611  2 611  2 611  3 402  6 013 
Finland  1 000  1 812  2 812  2 812  2 966  5 778 
Norway  1 000  1 790  2 790  2 790  2 713  5 503 
Italy  1 000  1 707  2 707  2 707  2 464  5 171 
Netherlands  1 000  1 413  2 413  2 413  2 614  5 027 
Austria  1 000  1 579  2 579  2 579  1 461  4 040 
France  1 000  1 363  2 363  2 363  1 565  3 928 
Canada  1 000  856  1 856  1 856  1 536  3 392 
Australia  1 000  726  1 726  1 726  1 625  3 351 
Irland  1 000  816  1 816  1 816  1 427  3 243 
Great Britain  1 000  894  1 894  1 894  1 263  3 157 
Portugal  1 000  977  1 977  1 977  1 065  3 042 
Spain  1 000  1 165  2 165  2 165  855  3 020 
New Zeeland  1 000  766  1 766  1 766  1 192  2 958 
Switzerland  1 000  639  1 639  1 639  902  2 541 
USA  1 000  650  1 650  1 650  881  2 531 
Japan  1 000  530  1 530  1 530  561  2 091 
            
weig. OECD aver.  1 000  1 007  2 007  2 007  1 435  3 442 
weig, EU average  1 000  1 588  2 588  2 588  2 323  4 911 
Comment: The yearly income of the seller and the buyer of the service are assumed to be equal to 
one respectively two yearly incomes of an average industry worker in the different countries. 
Source: DuRietz 2004 
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I guess the table speaks well for itself. It is quite obvious that when the marginal 
effects of taxes reach the levels at the top of the table, i.e. when you have to earn six, 
seven or even nine times what the seller gets after the job is done in order to buy a 
certain service, huge inefficiencies will arise in the economy. It should also be noted 





The burden of the welfare may not, however, only be measured in economic terms. 
In my view it also important to assess the effects of the welfare state and the high 
taxes necessarily associated with it from a broader, more normative perspective. In 
this section, the burden of the welfare state will be assessed in terms of its 
consequences on human dignity. First the concept of dignity must be explicated.
8 
 
Dignity is just like other important concepts such as ”justice” or ”democracy” 
genuinely contested. A number of possible interpretations exist. The view presented 
here, however, is in line with the mainstream traditions in classical liberalism as well 
as classical humanism according to which every individual has a unique value in 
herself and the view that the characteristics of a good society is individual liberty and 
the personal responsibility of every individual for her own life – in accordance with 
what she herself believe to be a good life – with equal respect for others’ liberty. With 
dignity also follows that the individual deserves respect, from himself as well as from 
others. But dignity has primarily a value in itself. 
 
To classical liberal as well as classical humanist such as Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola, Erasmus of Rotterdam, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baruch Spinoza and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt
9 human dignity was of prime importance, even though there 
certainly are great differences between their views. For example, the humanist 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola already in 1488 argued that human dignity is intimately 
                                                 
8 A longer, more elaborate versions of this section is published in Karlson (2004). 
9 See e.g. Pico della Mirandola (1996/1488), Erasmus (1964), Locke (1998/1690), Smith (1982/1759), 
Spinoza (2001) och Von Humboldt (1993/1852). 
  15connected with liberty, which makes the individual responsible for all her action, and 
thereby herself chooses her own character. Almost 400 years later the classical 
liberal Wilhelm von Humboldt (1993/1852, p. 10) makes the same argument in the 
following way: 
 
The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates 
of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most 
harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. Freedom 
is the first and indispensable condition which the possibility of such a development 
presupposes… 
 
There is also a strong connection between this perspective and Aristotle’s (1988) 
view of what it is that constitutes a good, happy and virtuous life. According to him 
the highest good is eudaimoni, which usually is translated as ”human flourishing”, by 
which is meant acting in such a way that we fulfil our potential as rational and social 
human beings. Every individual is born with this potential and the method to be used 
to achieve it is to form one’s character through good habits, practical wisdom and 
virtues. 
 
Dignity, defined as taking active responsibility for one’s own life project, may then 
look very differently to different individuals. Since we all have different experiences, 
interests and priorities the good life will differ between persons and we should 
therefore respect and tolerate different ways of living. Our concept of dignity is thus 
both including and universal – the freedom and responsibility are the same for 
everyone. Of importance is also that every individual, also the weak and unfortunate, 
is given the opportunity to live a dignified life. 
 
Dignity thus takes its starting point in the liberty of the individual, understood in the 
sense of non-interference. Paternalism is not in general compatible with dignity, even 
though some exceptions exist, as I shall argue below. Closely related to individual 
liberty is personal responsibility. Only if you could have acted in another way are you 
responsible for your actions. Liberty is in fact a prerequisite for responsibility. Figure 3 
below illustrates the relationship between liberty, responsibility and dignity: 
  





              Yes                 No  
                                         
                                           Yes                No          No dignity 
Responsibility? 
 
              Dignity  No dignity 
 
A first requirement for dignity is, then, that individual liberty is guaranteed. If the state 
can promote this it is thus positive. But if the opposite is true – e.g. if the welfare state 
through taxes and regulations limit the liberty of the individual – then it is negative for 
dignity. 
 
The second requirement is that that the individual herself takes responsibility for his 
actions. Without liberty this is not possible. But responsibility is of course also to a 
large extent a voluntary choice. The question is then what it is that may make the 
individual take her responsibility. And can legislation and acts by the state promote 
responsibility in certain situations? Here the analysis immediately becomes more 
complicated. 
 
In the tradition mentioned above there is an optimistic view of the individual’s ability 
to learn from successes as well as mistakes. We learn to take responsibility by taking 
responsibility, which again requires freedom. To emphasise learning through the 
taking of responsibility also highlights the role of the social environment in which the 
individual acts. The norms, morals and feedback mechanisms characteristic of this 
environment are essential for our own views about responsibility. Responsibility also 
requires that the individual has resources of her own. Such resources, in particular 
knowledge and wealth, are also created in interaction with the environment in which 
the individual acts. Two types of environments are of prime importance: markets and 
the communities of civil society. 
 
  17To be able to support oneself and one’s kin is essential to dignity. Without an income 
it is very hard to actively form a life project. Productive work is thus a prerequisite for 
dignity. Consequently a dynamic market economy with an extensive division of labour 
and specialisation is of  primary importance for dignity, since only such a system can 
create long-term prosperity and employment. Moreover, the market process itself can 
be described as a learning process where the individual actors constantly use their 
freedom and take responsibility for their decisions, the bad as well as the good ones. 
The market also creates the resources that are essential to dignity. We cannot 
choose any type of economic system and still believe that we can promote liberty, 
responsibility and dignity. The same is true for civil society. To a large extent it is 
within the communities, families and voluntary associations of the civil society that 
our views on personal responsibility is formed. Consequently, a vital civil society is 
fundamental to dignity. 
 
Now, what does all this mean for the assessment of the welfare state? Let me start 
by briefly propose what the state may do to promote dignity. Both markets and the 
civil society need some basic institutions in order to work well. Basic liberties have to 
be secured and basic responsibilities be defined in relation to them. This is essential 
for human dignity. Of fundamental importance is a system of individual rights and 
liberties which protects each individual’s life, freedom and property against the 
encroachment of others. The basic requirements of the rule of law must be fulfilled. In 
practice, also various types of contract laws, civil laws, tort laws, family laws etc. are 
important. In these areas the state has a constructive role to play. 
 
Moreover, and perhaps more controversially, the state may also have a role in 
guaranteing that every individual, also the weak and unfortunate, is given the 
resources necessary to live a dignified life, if and only if these resources are not 
created in the markets or the civil society. The reason is that this is a prerequisite for 
the respect of the unique value of every individual. It should be noted that a certain 
measure of paternalism here is introduced.  
 
Also it is quite apparent that we have a somewhat difficult trade-off question to 
handle. Concerning children’s right to education and the genuinely handicapped’s 
right to support the state has an important role to play. But in almost all other cases 
  18and situations it is the responsibility of the individual himself to use his freedom to live 
in dignity. Private savings, private wealth and private insurance are always better 
from the perspective of dignity. The role of the state should not be to undermine the 
liberty of the individual or to take away her responsibility for her own life through 
various types subsidies, interventions or taxes, apart from the cases identified above. 
 
My conclusion is therefore that human dignity unequivocally will decrease when the 
size of the state and the level of taxes reaches a certain level. Figure 4 below 
illustrates the general relationship between taxes and dignity: 
 
Figure 4: The relationship between taxes and dignity 
 






  19The initial upward slope of the curve requires that the taxes go to the areas identified 
above. The following downward slope is explained by the economic inefficiencies 
caused by high taxes – through weakened division of labour and specialisation, 
increased unemployment and staggering growth - discussed in the last section as 
well as by a less vital civil society. 
 
There can be no doubt that the Swedish welfare state is far beyond the peak of the 
curve.




Lessons for Other Countries 
 
The Swedish welfare state and the high tax levels necessarily associated with it likely 
to have been very harmful to human dignity. Most Swedes have become heavily 
dependent on the state and have neither means nor the ability to take responsibility 
for their own lives. Through various types of interventions, either by benevolent but 
largely incompetent politicians or by narrow and myopic special interests, the state 
has slowly but steadily crowded out markets as well as the communities in civil 
society. Consequently, the taxes have reached such levels that huge inefficiencies 
exist in the Swedish economy, with comparatively low growth as an unavoidable 
consequence. 
 
The burden of the welfare state is great indeed.  
 
Other countries, such as Germany, which are approaching the Swedish situation 
should beware. No one knows for sure when the point of no return is reached. 
                                                 
10 Moberg (1994) has calculated the tax level necessary to provide all the standard collective goods, 
basic education for all children up through 12
th grade and a basic social security net. Using the current 
Swedish public expenditures in these areas as estimates this amounts to around 15 percent of GDP, 
to be compared with the present level of 57 percent. 
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